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THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHT TO HABITAT PROTECTION: A
SOHAPPY SOLUTION-United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 407 (1985).
Commercial fishermen, sports fishermen, and Indians have argued over
shares of the dwindling salmon resource for decades.' But the issue of
whether treaty fishing rights reserve to treaty Indians the right to have the
fishery protected from environmental degradation by the State of Washington unites all three groups as never before. Their common interest in
conserving the fish-in increasing the size of the pie rather than continuing
to quibble over portions-transforms adversaries into allies. Affirmation of
the treaty-protected right to habitat protection would not only honor the
nation's legal commitment to Indian tribes but would also benefit all
fishermen.
The issue of habitat protection was addressed, though not resolved, in
UnitedStates v. Washington (PhaseI1).2 The Ninth Circuit denied declaratory relief on the question of whether Indian treaty fishing rights in the
Pacific Northwest extend to protection of the salmon habitat.3 The court
declined to reach the merits of the environmental issue as contrary to the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. 4 At the same time the court affirmed

1. The fishing rights controversy began in the mid-nineteenth century with encounters between

white settlers and Northwest tribes who relied on the abundant salmon. FAY COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL:
THE CoTwIumG CoNTRovasY ovER NomwrnwEsT INDiAN FisHNG RIGHTs xi-xii (1986). Under negotiated treaties, which permitted white settlement, the Indians retained their rights to take fish. See infra
note 10 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court addressed ensuing disputes over interpretation of
the treaty fishing right in seven cases: United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Seufert Bros. Co.
v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); Thlee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Puyallup Tribe v.
Department of Game (Puyallup 1), 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe
(Puyallup 1), 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup111), 433 U.S. 165
(1977); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979).
2. 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 407 (1985). PhaseI (popularly known as the
Boldt decision) refers to the litigation dealing with the allocation of off-reservation fish between Indians
and non-Indians, see supra note 8 and accompanying text. Phase 1I refers collectively to all of the
litigation dealing with the issues of whetherhatchery fish are included in the computation of the Indians'
treaty share and whether the fishing clause implies an environmental right to have the fishery habitat
protected from man-made despoliation. The district court opinion, United States v. Washington, 506 F
Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), was appealed by the State of Washington, and heard before a three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit, United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982). The panel
opinion was vacated, and an en banc hearing was granted, United States v. Washington, 704 F.2d 1141
(9th Cir. 1983). The en banc opinion, United States v. Washington, No. 81-3111, slip op. (9th Cir. Dec.
17, 1984) (opinion begins on page 5397), was withdrawn and replaced by a per curiam opinion, United
States v. Washington, 759 F2d 1353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 407 (1985).
3. Phase 11, 759 F.2d at 1355.
4. Id. at 1357.
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the district court's declaratory judgment that hatchery fish were included in
5
fish to be apportioned by Indian treaty.
This Note indicates that both the district court's use of declaratory relief
on the hatchery fish issue and the merits of its declaration on the environmental issue were entitled to affirmance. An analysis of the procedural
history of the case suggests that the court should have decided the environmental issue. An analysis of the right to habitat protection reveals that
habitat protection should be regarded as an implied term of the treaty right
to take fish and that measuring the scope of the right by the tribes' moderate
living needs fulfills the purpose of the treaty fishing clause. The measure of
the state's duty to honor that right, however, needs further definition.
Concern over acknowledgment of the Indians' right to habitat protection
focuses on one real issue: the potentially disruptive effect on the state's
development decisions. The cooperative approach taken by the Oregon
district court in Sohappy v. Smith6 relieves this concern by providing
workable guidelines for implementation of the treaty right. 7 Sohappy, in
which the state accords the Indians' rights weighted consideration, demonstrates that giving practical effect to the environmental right can be accomplished both effectively and economically through use of environmental
procedures already in place.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In United States v. Washington (Phase 1),8 Judge Boldt examined the
fishing clause which appeared in six treaties 9 negotiated between the
United States and Pacific Northwest Indian tribes in 1854 and 1855: "The
right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is
further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory
5. Id. at1360.
6. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).
7. Id. at 912.
8. 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1086 (1976), substantially aff'd sub nom. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
For an historical background of this phase of the treaty fishing rights controversy in the Pacific
Northwest, see Note, United States v. Washington (Phase II): The Indian Fishing Conflict Moves
Upstream, 12 ENVTL. L. 469, 470-82 (1982) (reviewing the history of the Phase H district court
decision, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980)). See also Comment,Empty Victories:Indian Treaty
FishingRights in the Pacific Northwest, 10 ENVTL.L. 413 (1980). For a more detailed description, see
FAY COHEN, supra note 1,at18-117.
9. Phase1, 384 F Supp. at 349 (citing Treaty with the Quinaeilt (Treaty of Olympia), 12 Stat. 971
(1859); Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (1859); Treaty with the Makah (Treaty of Neah Bay), 12 Stat.
939 (1859); Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132 (1855); Treaty of Point No Point, 12 Stat. 933
(1859); Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951 (1859)).

Habitat Protection
...
. "10 After examining the results of three years of extensive pretrial
preparation, including exhaustive research into anthropology, biology, and
fishery management,'1 the court held, in a declaratory judgment, that the
words "in common with" implied an equal sharing of the harvestable fish
12
between treaty tribes and non-Indians.
The plaintiffs in Phase I raised the issue of whether treaty rights extend
to protection of the environment. 13 However, the court reserved judgment
on claims for relief concerning alleged destruction of treaty right fishing
due to state authorization of obstruction of fishing streams, or impairment
of treaty right fishing by logging and other industrial pollution. 14 The court
approved the parties' stipulation to separate habitat protection claims for
determination after trial of the initial issue of allocation. 15 The hatchery fish
issue had also been separated from the district court's initial consideration
of Indian treaty fishing rights. 16
The current procedural tangle (PhaseII) began when the United States,
on behalf of several Indian tribes, brought suit against the State of Washington, seeking a declaratory judgment that artificially propagated hatchery
fish should be included in the allocation of the treaty tribes' share of the
harvestable fish. The United States also requested the court to declare that
the right to take fish incorporates the right to have the fish protected from
environmental degradation. 17 On the parties' cross motions for summary
judgment, Judge Orrick, who replaced Judge Boldt at the district court
level, 18 held that hatchery fish should be included in the computation of the
Indians' treaty share, 19 and that the fishing clause implicitly includes the
right to have the fishery habitat protected from man-made despoliation. 20
In addition, he found that the state must refrain from degrading or authorizing licensees or others to degrade the fish habitat to an extent that would
21
deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs.
10. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 350 (citing Treaty of Medicine Creek, art. I1, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133
(1855)). Each of the treaties contains a similar clause. Id.
11. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 328.
12. Id. at 343.
13. Id. at 328.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 344-45. Judge Boldt suggested that state courts were a more appropriate forum.
17. United States v. Washington (Phasell),506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd inpartand
rev'din part,694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, opinion replacedon reh'g en banc, 759 F.2d 1353

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 407 (1985).
18. Judge Boldt retired from the bench for health reasons in 1979 at the age of-76. Judge Orrick was
assigned to the case shortly before Judge Boldt retired. FAY CoHEN, supra note 1, at 86.
19. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 202.

20.

Id. at 203.

21.

Id. at208.
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On appeal before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, the district
court's declaratory judgment was affirmed with regard to the hatchery fish
issue but modified concerning environmental protection. 22 The court replaced the moderate living standard with a reasonableness test: when
considering projects threatening to then-existing harvest levels, "both the
State and the Tribes must take reasonable steps commensurate with the
respective resources and abilities of each to preserve and enhance the
fishery. "23
A majority of the active judges of the Ninth Circuit, however, voted to
rehear the case en banc, 24 and the opinion of the three-judge panel was
withdrawn. 25 The en banc hearing resulted in dismissal of both issues for
lack of jurisdiction. 26 The court reasoned that a summary judgment on one
issue and a partial summary judgment on another are not final appealable
orders, despite the district court's characterization of its orders as "a final
27
declaratory judgment [which is] reviewable as such."

22. United States v. Washington (Phase11),
694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, opinion
replaced on reh'g en banc, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 407 (1985).
23. Id. at 1375.
24. United States v. Washington (Phase1!), 704 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983) (pursuant to Rule 25 of
the Rules of the United States Court of Appeals).
25. Id.
26. United States v. Washington (PhaseI1),
No. 81-3111, slip op. 5397, 5402 (9th Cir. Dec. 17,
1984).
27. Id. at 5399, 5402 (citing Amended Judgment (Jan. 12, 1981, Excerpt of Record (E. R.) 265,
267 $ 9)). The court stated that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the hatchery issue was
not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) because the environmental claim
was not completely resolved below and did not have the effect of terminating the entire lawsuit. Id. at
5400. The court reasoned that when summary judgment is granted on fewer than all the claims in a
lawsuit, the provisions of FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b) must be satisfied. Id. That Rule provides that an order
disposing of fewer than all the claims in an action may be appealed only if the district court makes both
"'an express determination that there is no just reason for delay" and "an express direction for entry of
judgment." FED. R. Ctv. P. 54(b). The appellate court found the district court's language insufficiently
indicative of either an express determination that delay was inappropriate or an express direction for
entry ofjudgment to comply with Rule 54(b). United States v. Washington (PhaseI),No. 8 1-3111, slip
op. at 5400 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1984).
The appellate court held that the lower court's grant of partial summary judgment on the environmental issue was not a final decision under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 (1982) because the issue of whether the state
had violated the tribes' right not to have the fisheries degraded and the issue of remedies had not yet been
resolved. Id. at 5400-10. The court characterized the judgment as an interlocutory order, appealable
under § 1292(b) (1982), and stated that neither the parties nor the district court had focused on why the
order on the environmental issue "involves a controlling question of law as to which there is a
substantial ground for difference of opinion," or how an interlocutory appeal on that issue "may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Id. at 5401-02 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1982)).
Judge Sneed, in an emphatic dissent, argued that the district court's disposition was properly before
the court of appeals under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2201 (1982) because it was a final declaratory
judgment. Id. at 5402-03 (Sneed, J., dissenting).

Habitat Protection
This en banc opinion was subsequently withdrawn.2 8 The state's petition
for rehearing was granted, 29 and this time the orders of the district court
were adjudged final and appealable. 30 The court, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed declaratory judgment on the hatchery fish issue and denied
31
declaratory judgment on the environmental issue.
II.

PROCEDURAL GROUNDS: EVADING THE ISSUE

The majority adopted an essentially de novo standard of review over the
district court's decision to grant declaratory relief.32 Dissenting justices
argued that the trial court's decision to award declaratory relief is a decision
that should be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. 33 Under either standard of review, however, the district court's use of declaratory relief was
entitled to affirmance.
Congress provided guidelines to the courts regarding the standard of
review in the Declaratory Judgment Act. 34 That act states that a declaratory
judgment is final and reviewable whether or not further relief is sought. 35 In
deciding whether to grant declaratory relief, a court must first consider
28. Phase II, 759 F.2d at 1354.
29. Id.
30. The court claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982) to review the district court's
grant of declaratory judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982). This time the court reasoned that
the plaintiffs were granted the only relief they sought, declaratory judgment on the environmental and
hatchery fish issues; therefore, the district court's judgment completely resolved the claims in Phase11.
Id. at 1356.
31. Id. at 1355. Although the state petitioned for and was denied certiorari on the hatchery issue,
neither side has appealed on the environmental issue. Phase 11, 106 S. Ct. 407. The tribes are
considering specific examples of the state's degradation or state-authorized degradation of the fishery
habitat for direct litigation at the district court level rather than exclusively using the mechanism of
declaratory judgment. Telephone interview with Phil Katzen, Evergreen Legal Services, in Seattle, Wa.
(Jan. 28, 1986).
32. Phasell,759 F.2d at 1356-57 ("The Court of Appeals must exercise its own sound discretion to
determine the propriety of the district court's grant or denial of declaratory relief.").
33. Phase II, 759 F.2d at 1362 (Nelson, J., with whom Skopil, J., joined, concurring in part,
dissenting in part), relying on A.L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324, 331 (1961);
Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180,185 (1952) ("an ample degree
of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges, must be left to the lower courts");
McGraw-Edison Co. v. Preformed Line Prods. Co., 362 F2d 339, 342, 344 (9th Cir.) (employing
declaratory relief is within the trial court's sound discretion, quoting Kerotest), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
919 (1966); and Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 588 F.2d 895, 900 (3rd Cir. 1978) (decision to grant or deny
declaratory relief reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
34. Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 964, (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982)).
35. [A]ny court of the United States. . . may declare the rights and other legal relations of any
interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
reviewable as such.
Id.
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whether the dispute between the parties is an actual controversy. 36 This
requirement, implicit in the Declaratory Judgment Act, is identical to the
case or controversy requirement of article III of the United States Constitution. 37 If such controversy exists the court must decide whether the judgment will be useful in clarifying or settling the legal relations in issue, and
whether it will terminate or relieve the uncertainty and controversy giving
rise to the proceeding. 38 Declaratory judgment on both the hatchery fish
issue and the environmental right to habitat protection satisfies each of
these conditions.
A.

The HabitatIssue Evaded

First, conflicting contentions between adverse parties in Phase H fulfill
the requirement of an actual controversy. 39 The tribes argued that their
treaty right to take fish included the right to have the fisheries habitat
protected to preserve the supply of fish.40 The state characterized the
alleged right as an "environmental servitude" and argued that the treaties
do not imply any such right.4 1 Second, declaratory judgment on the
environmental issue would also accomplish the goals of clarifying and
settling the legal relations in issue and relieving the uncertainty giving rise
to the proceeding. In order to make development decisions which may
threaten the fishery, the state needs to know whether, and the extent to
which, the fishery must be protected from environmental degradation.
Specifically, the state needs to know whether, if it acts in a given way, it will
be subject to suit. In order to make informed decisions concerning their
futures as fishermen, treaty tribes need to know whether their right of
36. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); see also Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937).
37. Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. Hunter Eng'g Co., 655 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir.
1981).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
3536 (1984); Laguna Hermosa Corp. v. Martin, 643 F.2d 1376,1378 (9th Cir. 1981); Peerless Ins. Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 636, 636 (9th Cir. 1968); E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 299

(1941).
39. The difference between an abstract question and a "controversy" contemplated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be
possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such a
controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all the
circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
40. Brief for Appellee at 13, United States v. Washington (Phasell), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982).
41. Brief for Apellant at 9, 21, United States v. Washington (Phase11), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.
1982).
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taking fish includes the right to have the fisheries habitat protected to
preserve the supply of fish.
If a declaratory judgment resolves a significant issue in controversy, it
need not resolve all disputed issues. 42 The majority indicated that declara43
tory relief should be denied when it will not terminate the proceedings. It
is true that the district court noted that further relief proceedings would
follow the issuance of a partial summary judgment. 44 Declaratory judgment on the environmental issue would not have resolved all the issues, but
a decision on this issue would have advanced significant interests of all
parties in the case. Development of the Pacific Northwest in the form of
dam building, logging, farming, mining, industry, even residential development, threatens the fishery.45 A clarification of state obligations with
respect to habitat protection under the treaty would have resulted in informed decision making in the permit-issuing process. Indian treaty fishermen would have learned to what extent they could rely on the continued
existence of salmon in their usual and accustomed fishing places.
Declaratory judgments deciding only issues as to certain rights have
previously been recognized in Indian treaty interpretation cases by the
Ninth Circuit.46 Judge Boldt specifically contemplated that further pro42. E. BORCHARD, supranote 38, at 298; 6A J. MOORE,MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.08[4],
at 57-47 (1985).
43. Phase II, 759 F.2d at 1357.
44. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 205-06.
45. FAY CoHN, supra note 1, at 86. See also R. Ci uERaosE & M. TriuM, PACIFIC SALMON AND
STE'L-mEA TRouT 49-76 (1979) for a detailed explanation of environmental threats to the anadromous
fishery.
46. E.g., in 1974, Judge Boldt himself had interpreted 120-year-old treaty rights through the
mechanism of declaratory judgment. That decision was no different procedurally from the decision of
the district court in the present litigation. Judge Boldt's court held that the treaty guaranteed Indian
fishermen a specific share of the fish; that decision was appealed and affirmed. United States v.
Washington (Phase1), 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), substantiallyaff'd sub noma.
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). The district court then implemented the
decision with various orders on issues that arose from the resolution of the treaty interpretation. United
States v. Washington (Compilation of Major Post-Trial Substantive Orders), 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D.
Wash. 1978).
In a similar suit involving the interpretation of Indian treaty rights, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged
the validity of a declaratory judgment recognizing the existence of water rights. United States v. Adair,
723 F.2d 1394, 1397 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3536 (1984). The district court had issued a
declaratory judgment that established the water rights of various groups of landowners in a disputed
area. United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979). In Maison v. Confederated Tribes of
Umatilla Indian Reservation, 314 F.2d 169 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 829 (1963), declaratory
judgment settled a dispute concerning the Indians' treaty right to fish without state regulation. See also
United States v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979) (dispute over ownership of riverbed and
regulation of on-reservation hunting and fishing), rev'd, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Kimball v. Callahan, 493
F.2d 564 (9th Cir.) (dispute over rights of Klamath Indians who withdrew from tribe), cert. denied,419
U.S. 1019 (1974).
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ceedings would follow Phase I to resolve the environmental degradation
issue. 47 By refusing to examine the merits at this point, the court undermined the utility of the declaratory judgment process as a case management
mechanism and further delayed resolution of the issues.
The underlying factor in the Ninth Circuit's decision to deny summary
judgment seemed to be that the consequences of the legal ruling sought
were neither known nor understood. 48 The court stated that it would serve
neither the needs of the parties, nor the jurisprudence of the court, nor the
interests of the public to employ the declaratory judgment procedure to
announce rules "imprecise in definition and uncertain in dimension." 49
The unstated policy reason for the appellate court's decision may be that
the court would rather not extend its judicial involvement in fisheries management to administration of habitat protection as well. The Boldt decision
met with extensive state resistance, which forced the district court to take
over a large share of the management of the state's fishery in order to enforce
its decrees. 50 In light of that experience, the court might develop a natural
reluctance toward further involvement in administratively difficult treaty
interpretations. Effective implementation of the environmental right, however, would not require extensive judicial supervision, because the substantive right could be asserted through existing environmental procedures. 51
The Ninth Circuit seemed reluctant to reach the merits of the declaration,
evading the issue on procedural grounds. The court avoided its judicial
responsibility, however, by declining to review the merits de novo. The
environmental right to habitat protection is a legal question of treaty
interpretation mandating direct confrontation by the appellate court.
B.

The Hatchery Fish Issue Decided

Acting in contrast to its disposition of the habitat issue, the Ninth Circuit
reached the merits of the separate issue of whether hatchery fish were
included in the tribes' treaty allocation. 52 The court held declaratory
47. Phase1, 384 F. Supp. at 328.
48. Phase11, 759 F.2d at 1357.
49. Id. Such a statement raises unanswered questions: What rules would be imprecise? Is not the
court only asked to define the state's duty? Is the court afraid that it is physically and economically
impossible to preserve the fisheries habitat? Should the court be worrying over remedies at the
declaratory judgment level?
50. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978),
vacated, Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658
(1979). See also United States v. Washington (PhaseI), Compilation of Major Post-Trial Substantive
Orders, 459 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
51. See infra text accompanying notes 166-88.
52. United States v. Washington (Phasel1),759 F.2d 1353(9th Cir.) (percuriam), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 407 (1985). In an earlier, withdrawn opinion, the same court held that no further proceedings on
this issue need occur because the state had been under an injunction since 1976 prohibiting it from
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judgment on this issue to be within the district court's discretion and
53
affirmed the declaration itself.
In reaching this holding, the court relied upon several points. First, the
court of appeals expressly approved the settled doctrine of construing
treaties as they were originally understood by tribal representatives. 54 In
ruling that hatchery fish are included in the computation of the Indians'
treaty share, the district court had emphasized the importance of the canons
of interpretation of Indian treaties. Second, the Ninth Circuit approved the
district court's reliance on Washington v. Washington State Commercial
PassengerFishing Vessel Association,55 in which the Supreme Court held
that the tribes are entitled under the treaty to an adequate supply of fish.
This holding supports the inclusion of hatchery fish in the computation of
fish to be shared. 56 Finally, the appellate court found that equitable considerations favored affirmance of the district court's declaratory judgment: (1)
the state does not own the fish once they are released; (2) the tribes are not
unjustly enriched by the ruling; (3) hatchery fish and natural fish are not
distinguished for other purposes; and (4) hatchery fish programs are designed to mitigate the losses of natural fish.5 7 The court concluded that
forcing the tribes to bear the full burden of the decline in natural fish caused
by non-Indians without sharing hatchery fish replacements would be ineq58
uitable and inconsistent with the treaties.
In narrowly focusing on the hatchery issue, without addressing the
habitat question, the court failed to recognize that the two issues are
interrelated: habitat degradation underlies the Indians' need for hatchery
fish. Resolution of the hatchery fish allocation problem does not adequately
protect treaty rights because replacement achieved through the hatcheries
excluding hatchery fish from the tribe's allocation. United States v. Washington (Phasell),No. 81-3111,
slip op. at 5399-5400 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1984) (citing United States v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 1020,
1072 (W.D. Wash. 1978)). The court reasoned that in the absence of other claims in the lawsuit, the
judgment would have been appealable as a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but
because the environmental claim had not been completely resolved below, summary judgment did not
have the effect of terminating the entire lawsuit. The entire appeal was dismissed for lack ofjurisdiction.

Id. at 5400.
Prior to the en banc hearing, a three-judge panel heard the appeal, and affirmed the district court's
finding that hatchery fish were included in the computation of the Indian's treaty share. United States v.
Washington (PhaseII), 506 F. Supp 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 694 F2d
1374 (9th Cir. 1982).

53. Phase 11, 759 F2d at 1357-58.
54. Id. at 1358 (citing Phase 11, 506 F. Supp. at 195 (quoting Washington v. Washington State
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,676 (1979))). See infra text accompanying

notes 60-79.
55. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
56.

Phase II, 759 F.2d at 1358.

57. Id. at 1359.
58.

Id.

739
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does not sufficiently compensate for the loss of natural fish through degra59
dation of habitat.
III.

HABITAT PROTECTION: A TREATY RIGHT THAT MUST BE
HONORED

"The most fundamental prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is
the existence of fish to be taken." ' 60 With that pronouncement, Judge
Orrick, at the district court level, held that the fishing clause of the treaties
implied an environmental right to have the fishery habitat protected from
man-made despoliation. The district court relied on a straightforward
syllogism: a primary purpose of the treaty was to reserve to the tribes the
right to continue fishing as an economic and cultural way of life; an
environmentally acceptable habitat is necessary to the survival of the fish,
without which the reserved right to take fish would be without meaning or
value; therefore, the implied environmental right must be recognized in
61
order to fulfill the purpose of the treaty.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit declined to decide the issue. Based on the
canons of construction applicable to Indian treaties, the precedent of other
fishing rights cases, analogies to the implied reservation of water doctrine,
and the practical necessity for judicially formalizing the treaty right to
habitat protection, the correct conclusion on the merits is that the treaties
gave the Indians a right to environmental protection.
A.

Canons of Construction:What Did the Tribes Think They Were
Signing?

In considering the hatchery fish issue, the Ninth Circuit approved the
district court's reliance upon established canons of interpretation of Indian
treaties. 62 These canons call for interpreting the treaties as the Indians
themselves would have understood them, 63 liberally construing the treaties
59. E.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981) (in recognizing a reserved right to water toprotect the tribe's fishery, the court also
recognized the importance of natural fish, and refused to allow the substitution of hatchery fish in their
place); see also R. CHILDERHOSE & M. TRIM, supra note 45, at 139-40 (limitations of hatcheries and
hatchery fish and the importance of natural fish); Ervin, Twilight of the Salmon, TiE WEEKLY
(SEATrLE), Sept. 18, 1985, at 41, col. 3 ("[Elnough problems remain to be wary of hatcheries as aquick
fix for declining fish runs.").
60. Phase 11, 506 F. Supp. at 203.
61. Id. at 205.
62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1904).
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in favor of the Indians, 64 and promoting the treaties' central purposes rather
than relying on technical rules. 65 Indian treaties must be read in light of the
prevailing notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted
them. 66 Weighing the intention of the parties at the time of negotiation
evolved from the idea that the United States government, as the party with
superior negotiating skills and superior knowledge of the language, had a
responsibility to avoid taking advantage of the tribes. 67 These canons were
equally applicable in analyzing the environmental right to habitat protection.
In order to determine how the Indians would have understood the treaties
at the time of their signing, courts require a clear grounding in the historical
perspective of the time. From the point of view of the young American
nation, formal treaty-making was a solution to a problem. Westward
expansion required large areas of land to which the Indians held legal
title. 68 The white settlers wanted to homestead and farm. The Indians
wanted to go on living in their homeland, continuing their traditional way
of life. Treaties represented a compromise between these conflicting objectives: Western expansion was accommodated, but the treaty tribes were to
continue their ancestral culture and established economy.
The Indian tribes of the Pacific Northwest depended on the availability of
fish, particularly anadromous fish, 69 for their livelihood. The native fishermen set up camps along the rivers to await the seasonal return of the
salmon. 70 To these people fish were "not much less necessary. . . than the
atmosphere they breathed." '7 1 The Indians depended upon salmon for
72
subsistence, trade, and ritual.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,11 (1899); Winans, 198 U.S. at 380-81.
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206 (1978).
Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,

675-76 (1978).
68. The United States could claim legal title through neither "discovery" of the continent nor the
divine right of kings. D. GErcHs, D. ROSEFrE.T & C. WIuaNSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 30 (1979), citing F. VicroiA, DE INDiS Er DE JuRE BELIu RELicIoNEs 128 (J. Bate trans.
1917) (orig.ed. 1557) (Indians were the true owners of the New World); see also Cohen, OriginalIndian
Title, 32 MINN. L. R . 28, 44 n.34 (1947).

69.

Anadromous fish are those five species of Pacific salmon (Sockeye, Pink, Coho, Chinook

and Chum) and the salmon-like steelhead trout that are born in fresh water, mature in the ocean, and
then return to their freshwater streams to spawn and die. Steelhead trout do not always die immediately after spawning; some survive to return to the sea. R. CHxnDEiHosE & M. T'Im, supra note 45,
at 22.
70. FAY COHEN, supra note 1, at 20-21.
71. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
72.
The first-salmon ceremony. . . was essentially a religious rite to ensure the continued
return of salmon. The symbolic acts, attitudes of respect and reverence, and concern for the salmon
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Although Indian fishing practices at treaty times were not absolutely
restricted geographically, ownership rights to specific fishing areas were
well developed. 73 Individual Indians had primary use rights in the rivers
near their winter villages, and they shared fishing rights in more distantly
located spring and summer fishing camps with people from other villages.
Permissive use rights applied to the territory where a person had been born
74
or had relatives.
At the time of the treaties, the Indians' dependence on anadromous fish
was well recognized. 75 The Indians ceded their lands and with them their
nomadic way of life, but they reserved their fishing rights. The Indians of
the 1850's understood that tribal fishing would continue as it had before the
treaties. 76 The only restraint placed on the exercise of the fishing right was
the necessity of sharing with the "citizens of the territory." ' 77 No one
contemplated that sharing with the citizens would cause abundance to
become scarcity, least of all the Indians who customarily stopped fishing
78
once their needs had been met.
reflected a ritualistic conception of the interdependence and relatedness of all living things which
was a dominant feature of native Indian world view. Religious attitudes and rites insured that
salmon were never wantonly wasted and that water pollution was not permitted during the salmon
season.
Phasel, 384 F. Supp. 312, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
73. FAY COHEN, supra note 1, at 21-22.
74. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 353.
75. Id. at 351-52.
76. "Reluctant to be confined to small reservation bases, the Indian negotiators insisted that their
people continue to fish as they had beyond the reservation boundaries." Id. at 333. Information
resulting from three years of pretrial preparation, including "exhaustive research in anthropology," id.
at 328, presumably is the court's basis for this statement. Subsequently, the court stated:
At the treaty negotiations, a primary concern of the Indians whose way of life was so heavily
dependent upon harvesting anadromous fish, was that they have freedom to move about to gather
food, particularly salmon, (which both Indians and non-Indians meant to include steelhead), at
their usual and accustomed fishing places.
Id. at 355 (citations omitted).
77. There is neither mention nor slightest intimation in the treaties themselves, in any of the treaty
negotiation records or in any other credible evidence, that the Indians who represented the
tribes in the making of the treaties, at that time or any time afterward, understood or intended
that the fishing rights reserved by the tribes as recorded in the above quoted language would, or
ever could, authorize the "citizens of the territory" or their successors, either individually or
through their territorial or state government, to qualify, restrict or in any way interfere with the
full exercise of those rights. All of the evidence is overwhelmingly to the contrary, particularly
in the vivid showing in the record that the treaty Indians pleaded for and insisted upon retaining
the exercise of those rights as essential to their survival.
Id. at 334 (emphasis in original).
78. FAY COHEN, supra note 1, at 24-25. The number of available fish is indeed declining. Between
1883 and 1977, fish catches on the Columbia River fell from 44 million pounds to 5 million. Ervin,
supra note 59, at 40, col. 3. It is estimated that the natural runs declined to less than half of their
pretreaty size by 1980. FAY COHEN, supra note 1, at 141-42.
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The treaty right is a contract right; it is not a question of equal protection.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the argument that nondiscriminatory equal treatment of Indians and non-Indians fulfills the state
obligations under the treaties. 79 Treaty tribes bargained not for equal
treatment, but for the right to take the fish necessary to support the tribes'
existence.80 The contract clause was fishing in exchange for land, not
economic development in exchange for land. In attempting to deny an
implied environmental right to habitat protection, the state argued that
when the Indians signed the treaties, they bargained for both the costs and
the benefits of economic development. 8' However, the evidence established
that treaty negotiators specifically assured the tribes that they could continue to fish despite changes that might be brought about by western
expansion. 8 2 That Indians benefit equally with other citizens from economic development is irrelevant to the treaty right to take fish.
Non-Indian development, to an extent unforeseen at the time of the
83
treaties, does not alter the nature of the promises made to the Indians.
Canons of construction and considerations of fairness require that courts
examine the original purposes of Indian treaties. The purpose of the fishing
clause was to secure the treaty tribes' right to continue fishing in common
with non-Indian settlers. Both parties to the treaties understood the fundamental importance of fish to the Indians.8 4 Indian treaties are broadly
interpreted in the Indians' favor, with assumptions going against the United
States government, as the superior bargaining power and drafter of the
document.8 5 The treaties assumed the continued existence of fish to be
shared; therefore, habitat protection, when necessary for the continued

79. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
676-77 n.22 (1979). See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
80. Phase!!, 759 F.2d at 1366 (Nelson, J., with whom Skopil, J.,joined, dissenting). See infranote
90 and note 85 and accompanying text.
81. PhaselI, 506F. Supp. at204.
82. Id.
83. Phase1,384 F. Supp at 401. Such development may affect the ability of the state to comply, but
this question is distinct from the question of the nature of the remedy.
84. During the negotiations, the vital importance of the fish to the Indians was repeatedly
emphasized by both sides, and the Governor's promises that the treaties would protect that
source of food and commerce were crucial in obtaining the Indians' assent.. . It is absolutely
clear, as Governor Stevens himself said, that neither he nor the Indians intended that the latter
"should be excluded from their ancient fisheries,". . and it is accordingly inconceivable
that either party deliberately agreed to authorize future settlers to crowd the Indians out of any
meaningful use of their accustomed places to fish.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 676.
85. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194
(1919); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
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existence of the fish, 86 becomes a vital component of the living treaty.
Interpreting the treaty in terms of the parties' intent at the time, then,
strongly suggests that habitat protection is an implied term of the treaty
right to take fish.
B.

Basis in Precedent:Maintaininga FairShare

A common theme runs through all the fishing rights litigation: Neither
party to the treaties may deprive the other of a fair share of the fish. 87 The
Supreme Court has held that non-Indians could not monopolize all the
available fish to the detriment of the treaty tribes. 88 Conversely, the Court
has upheld the state's right to regulate Indian fishing in the interest of
conservation. 89 However, it has also repudiated discriminatory regulation
90
against the Indians.
In times of scarcity, unlimited Indian fishing at "usual and accustomed
places" on the rivers where the salmon are returning to spawn can interfere
with conservation of the resource if sufficient fish are not allowed to escape.
On the other hand, if non-Indian ocean overfishing leaves only enough fish
for spawning purposes, then the Indians' right to take fish is impaired. 91
The courts have been faced with the problem of balancing Indian and nonIndian rights before. The Supreme Court solved the problem by apportioning equal shares of the harvestable fish. 92 The general proposition that
neither party to the treaties may act in a manner that destroys the fishery has
also been upheld at the district court level in barring construction of a dam
86. See infra text accompanying notes 115-32.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States,
249 U.S. 194 (1919); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681(1942); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game
(Puyallup 1), 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44
(1973); Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game (Puyallup III 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
88. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (state-licensed fishing wheel, a device which
mechanically dipped the fish out of the river without allowing for escapement for spawning purposes,
cannot be used to exclude Indians from taking fish at their usual and accustomed places).
89. PuyallupI, 391 U.S. 392 (1968). The court upheld the authority of the state to regulate fishing
by the Indians in common with fishing by others in the interest of conservation. However, whether the
prohibition of the use of set nets at locations where the Indians placed them was reasonable and
necessary for conservation is to be determined by the state court. See also PuyallupIll, 433 U.S. 165
(1977) (the tribes' right to take steelhead passing through the reservation is subject to regulation by the
state pursuant to its power to conserve an important natural resource).
90. Puyallup11, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (a ban on Indian net-fishing in favor of non-Indian hook and
line fishing for steelhead held impermissible; the regulation of steelhead fishing must achieve an
accommodation between the Puyallups' net-fishing rights and the rights of sports fishermen).
91. United States v. Washington (Phase1), 520 F.2d 676, 685-86 (9th Cir. 1975) (neither party may
permit the subject matter of the treaties (the fish) to be destroyed by overfishing).
92. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685.
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which would have flooded treaty Indians' usual and accustomed fishing
93
stations and destroyed the steelhead fishery.
In arguing the environmental issue in Phase II, both the state and the
tribes relied on Washington v. Washington State CommercialPassenger
FishingVessel Association,94 the latest in the line of Supreme Court cases
recognizing the reciprocal rights and obligations of the treaty parties. In
FishingVessel, the measure of the common right to take fish was at issue:
After dividing the harvestable fish into approximately equal treaty and
nontreaty shares, could the Indians' percentage be varied in either direction? 95 Two possible limits of the treaty Indians' share were identified.
First, the equitable measure of the common right was held to be a fifty-fifty
division. 96 But the Court also held that the treaties secured only as many
fish as were necessary to provide the Indians with a moderate living. 97 The
question was how these two standards should be reconciled: Could the
Indians take more than fifty percent if necessary to satisfy their needs? Or
could they take only the number of fish necessary to satisfy their livelihood
needs, up to a ceiling of fifty percent? The Court held that the Indian share
of fifty percent of the harvestable fish was a maximum figure rather than a
minimum. 98 Because the substance of the bargained-for consideration in
the treaties was the right to a reasonable livelihood by taking fish, 99 the fifty
percent maximum possible allocation could be reduced if the Indians'
moderate living needs could be satisfied by less. Modification downward
could be made in response to the changing circumstances of the Indians. 100
In Phase II, the state emphasized that the tribes are entitled only to a
share of the fish, rather than a specific quantity, and reasoned that since the
Court permitted a possible reduction of that share, the Supreme Court
decision did not guarantee the Indians all the fish needed to meet the
93. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F. Supp. 553, 555 (D.
Or. 1977). Government intervention-trapping and hauling Chinook above the dam-would have
mitigated the losses of some species, but the steelhead run would have been entirely eliminated. The
court held that treaty rights could not be nullified in this way, absent express congressional authoriza-

tion. Id.
94. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
95.

Id. at 686.

96. Id. at 685.
97.
98.

Id. at 686.
Id.

99. Id. at 685-87.
100. Id. at 686. "If, for example, a tribe should dwindle to just a few members, or if it should find
other sources of support that lead it to abandon its fisheries," then it would be "manifestly inappropriate" to allow the tribes to retain their right to half the fish runs. Id. at 687. The reduction of the treaty
tribes' share of fish in response to changing circumstances is to be made upon proper submission to the
district court. Id. at 686-87. The Court did not suggest, nor did the state argue, that "changing

circumstances" might refer to any condition other than the situation of Indian fishermen.
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moderate living standard. 10 1 The district court in PhaseH, however, agreed
with the tribes' interpretation of Fishing Vessel, and found an implied
environmental right because the tribes' negotiated right was to the quantity
of fish necessary to meet their fair needs. 10 2 The tribes focused on the
purpose of the treaties-sufficient fish to allow them to continue their
traditional fishing economy-whereas the state focused solely on the
possibility of reducing the tribal share.
Fishing Vessel does not directly answer the question because the only
issue in FishingVessel was apportionment. Indirectly, however, the holding
in Fishing Vessel supports the treaty right to habitat protection. The
Supreme Court defined the rights and duties of both parties to the treaties in
line with its previous policy of allowing neither party to deprive the other of
a fair share of the fish. 103 The Court defined the Indians' "fair share" by
their reasonable livelihood needs. The Court drew up the fish allocation
scheme to insure that the Indians' reasonable livelihood needs would be
met. 104 This policy, applied to the issue of habitat protection, would result
in a state duty to refrain from taking or approving environmental actions
which would significantly damage or destroy the treaty right fishery.
Phase 11 failed to address the issue of threats to the resource from
environmental degradation. The well-established rule that neither party to
the treaties may infringe upon the fishing rights of the otherl0 5 leads to the
conclusion that direct controls should be imposed for conservation of the
habitat, just as controls specifying where, how, and when people may fish
have been imposed in the interest of conservation. Both parties have a
continuing interest in the preservation of salmon; both must be prevented
from endangering their shared resource.
C. Analogy to the Winters Implied Water Rights Doctrine
The district court reasoned that the environmental right to habitat protection secured by the fishing right was analogous to the implied reservation of
water doctrine announced in Winters v. United States. 106 In Winters, the
101. Brief for Appellant at 15-20, United States v. Washington (Phase11), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.
1982).
102. Phase H, 506 F. Supp. at 208.
103. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
104. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686. See supra note 82.
105. Id. at 684.
106. Phase 11, 506 F. Supp. at 204 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908)). The
power of the federal government to exempt the waters required to fulfill the purposes of reservations
from appropriation under state law was upheld in Winters and reaffirmed in subsequent decisions.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138
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Supreme Court examined the intention of the parties in creating the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation, which was to enable the tribe to give up its
nomadic existence and sustain itself by agriculture on a relatively small
tract of land. 107 Although the agreement made no mention of water rights,
the Court held that the parties implied the reservation of a sufficient
quantity of water to irrigate the arid reservation land. 108 Without water, the
purpose of the agreement would be frustrated. 109
The Winters doctrine states that the intent for which the reservation was
created is controlling in determining the federally reserved water right. The
Supreme Court has applied the rule to provide water for the preservation of
a fish habitat. 110 The Ninth Circuit has considered reserved water rights for
fishing purposes and found that there was an implied reservation of waters
for the development and maintenance of replacement fishing grounds on
the reservation. 11 Water rights on former reservation lands have also been
upheld when the purpose of the treaty was to preserve the tribes' hunting
and fishing culture.112
(1976); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-600 (1963).
The Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which permits federal regulation of navigable
streams, and the Property Clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, which permits federal regulation offederal lands,
are the bases for the reservation of water rights. The doctrine applies to other federal enclaves, as well as
Indian reservations, and encompasses water rights in both navigable and nonnavigable streams.
Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 805 (1976); United States v. District
Court ofCounty of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520,522-23 (1971); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 601; Federal
Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939).
107. Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-77.
108. Id. at 576-77.
109. Id. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976), contains an excellent explanation of
the reserved water rights doctrine:
[W]hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated
to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States
acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is
superior to the rights of future appropriators.
110. In Cappaert,426 U.S. 128, a presidential proclamation setting aside a pool to preserve
pupfish was held implicitly to reserve sufficient water to protect pupfish spawning grounds, although no
express reservation of water was made. Cappaertdealt with the reservation of public land for Devil's
Hole National Monument, rather than with the federal reservation of land for treaty tribes..
111. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981). The Colville's traditional fishing grounds had been destroyed by dams. The situs of the
dispute was reservation land, but the decision turned on the purpose of the treaty: the reserved right to
fish.
112. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1417 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3536
(1984). The court stated that the Klamath Tribe still held water rights on former reservation lands
because their treaty hunting and fishing rights required the maintenance of a natural streamfiow for the
preservation of the fish and game habitat. One of the purposes of establishing the Klamath Reservation
was to secure to the tribe a continuation of its traditional hunting and fishing culture. Id. at 1409.
Therefore, water rights arose by necessary implication. Id. at 1418. In this case, unlike Winters, the
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In Winters, water was necessary for farming; in PhaseII, environmental
protection is necessary for fishing. The necessity arises because the essential element of the treaty right to take fish is the continuing existence of
salmon. Implicit in the survival of the fish is the existence of an environmentally acceptable habitat without which the expressly reserved right to
take fish would be without meaning or value. 113 Therefore, the implied
environmental right must be recognized in order to fulfill the purpose of the
fishing clause.
Moreover, Winters cannot be distinguished on the basis that that case
referred to rights running with land belonging to the Indians. It is true that
although the primary purpose of the treaties in PhaseH was to maintain the
Indians' fishing economy, the reserved right to take fish was not appurtenant to reservation land. The Winters doctrine analogy, however, is to the
nature of reserved rights, rather than to the physical fact of the existence of
reservation land. A recent Ninth Circuit opinion held that the maintenance
of water flow in sufficient quantity to protect redds (nests of salmon eggs)
was necessary for the protection of treaty fishing rights. 114 Indian reserved
water rights have also been protected against impairment of water quality. 115 These cases indicate that the government cannot allow activity
elsewhere that either diminishes water quantity or damages water quality
when Indians have treaty-protected water rights. The result is the same
regardless of the source of the rights, whether those rights were acquired
appurtenant to reservation land or were acquired through express treaty
language in exchange for land.
The implicit reservation of the right to water in Winters and its progeny
was based on the primary purpose of the treaties, which was to make
farmers of the Indians. The implicit reservation of the right to habitat
protection in PhaseII is based on the primary purpose of the treaties, which
was to preserve the tribal fishing culture. 116 Winters doctrine water rights
hunting and fishing water rights were not appurtenant to the land subsequently transferred by the tribe.
The tribe and its members retained the right to hunt and fish; by implication rights to the water necessary
to support that right were also retained. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1418 n.31.
113. Phase l, 506 F. Supp. at 205.
114. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 593 (1985). There, the court adjudicated a controversy between Eastern Washington
farmers, who needed water for irrigation, and Yakima Nation fishermen, who needed water to preserve
their fishing rights. The court interpreted a 1945 consent decree, which specified the amounts of water
delivered to irrigation districts, in light of the Nation's treaty fishing right, and held that the maintenance of water flow for the protection of that fishing right was a reasonable emergency measure, despite
the irrigation rights granted under the consent decree. Id. at 1034-35.
115. United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1(E.D. Wash. 1982) (holding the unimpaired flow of
sufficient quantities of water to maintain a water temperature of 68 degrees to be necessary for the
protection of native trout located on an Indian reservation). See also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 587 (1982) (water quality probably protected under the Winters doctrine).
116. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 333-34, 355.
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have also been linked to environmental protection when necessary for the
protection of the treaty fishing right. 117 Therefore, the Winters doctrine
supports the recognition of the environmental right.
D.

Acknowledging the EnvironmentalRight: A Beneficial Side Effect

The practical effect of acknowledging the treaty right to habitat protection is increased cooperation between the tribes, the state, and private
businesses. The district court ruling that the tribes' treaty rights extend to
protection of the salmon's habitat prompted some major Washington corporations and irrigation districts1 18 to begin a dialogue with the Indians in
order to avoid potential lawsuits. That dialogue led to talks between the
tribes and the Northwest Steelhead and Salmon Council and between the
tribes and the Game and Fisheries departments. Out of the tribes' negotiations with the state fisheries agencies came jointplans for managing salmon
and steelhead harvests. 119 Yet it is important to remember that this recent
tribal/state cooperation developed only after the tribes had gained a strong,
20
judicially-supported position from which to bargain. 1
IV.

HONORING THE RIGHT TO A PROTECTED HABITAT

Existing state regulation to preserve fishery resources has been most
concerned with the danger of overfishing. However, losses of salmon also
occur as a result of non-Indian logging, road building, pulp mills, mining,
power dams, port development, sewage disposal, and chemical pollution. 121 These factors, therefore, must be taken into account to ensure that
117. See supra notes 111-12, 115-16.
118. Ervin, supra note 59, at 40, col. 1 (e.g., Burlington Northern, Chevron, Puget Power, and
Weyerhauser).
119. Id.
120. Even when the tribes have the support of the courts, implementation of their fishing rights has
the district court has faced the most
been difficult. "Except for some desegregation cases ....
concerted official and private efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century."
Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 1978)
(referring to the state's "extraordinary machinations" to resist complying with the 1974 Boldt decision).
Other former foes are joining forces to confront environmental threats to the salmon after Phase II.
Trout Unlimited, an organization of sports fishermen, spent $100,000 in legal fees to help appeal the
adverse Phase I decision; when the treaty-protective ruling was upheld by the Supreme Court, the
organization backed legislation to "decommercialize" steelhead trout. Gaffney, Beyond Boldt When
Ten Years ofLawsuits FailedTo AddAnother Steelhead, TRoUT, Winter 1986, at 51, 52. After PhaseII,
Trout Unlimited redirected its energies and funds toward cooperation with the treaty tribes rather than
confrontation. Herbst, Living Brightwater,TRoUT, Winter 1986 at 82, 82. A resolution adopted by the
National Board of Trout Unlimited in June 1985, affirmed Native American rights to fish and wildlife
and pledged their cooperation with native Americans to enhance the coldwater fishery resource. Id.
121. R. CnLoitDtHOsE & M. TIM, supra note 45, at 2. Although the authors direct their comments
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neither party "takes" an unfair proportion of the fish. 122 In finding that the
treaty tribes had a right to habitat protection, the district court relied on a
23
fisheries study prepared jointly by the federal government and the state. 1
That study listed five specific environmental conditions that must be
present in order for salmon and steelhead trout to survive: (1) access to and
from the sea, (2) an adequate supply of good-quality water, (3) a sufficient
amount of suitable gravel for spawning and egg incubation, (4) an ample
supply of food, and (5) sufficient shelter. 124 Alteration of even one of these
requirements will affect production potential. These conditions have been
altered by urbanization and residential settlement, the rapid development of
water power, lumbering and irrigation, and the pollution of the watersheds. 125
The state argued to the Ninth Circuit in Phase11126 that federal and state
statutes already protect the environment for anadromous fish to some
extent. 127 It maintained that an additional burden on state agencies to
protect environmental rights for Indian fisheries was unnecessary because
the state is required to manage the resource for the benefit of all fishermen,
commercial and sports, Indian and non-Indian. 128 Further, discriminatory
regulation is prohibited by Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game
(Puyallup1). 129 The state asserted that it is not in the state's interest to allow
the fish to decline. To do so would injure non-Indian fishermen as well as
30
treaty Indians. 1
to Canada's salmon management problems, it is logical to assume their observations will apply even
more insistently to the Northwest fishery, since the Northwest is generally more industrialized than
Canada.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 87-102.
123. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 203 (quoting UNITED STATES FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, WASH.
DEPT. OF FISHERIES, & WASH. DEPT. OF GAME, JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING THE BIOLOGY, STATUS,
MANAGEMENT, AND HARVEST OF THE SALMON AND STEELHEAD RESOURCES OF THE PUGET SOUND AND
OLYMPIC PENINSULAR DRAINAGE AREAS OF WESTERN WASHINGTON 17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as JOINT
BIOLOGY STATEMENT].

124.

Id.

125.

Id. (quoting JOINT BIOLOGY STATEMENT, supra note 123, at 20, 78).

126. 694 F.2d at 1384-85 (before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit). The decision was
subsequently withdrawn, reheard en banc, withdrawn again, and reheard per curiam. See supra note 2.
127. Id. (citing Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,
§ 2, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Marine Protection,
Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1431-1434 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)); Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86
Stat. 1280 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1976)); Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h (Supp.
IV 1980)); Shoreline Management Act, ch. 286, 1971 Wash. Laws 1496 (1st Exec. Sess.); Act of Mar.
20, 1973, ch. 155, Sec. 4, 1973 Wash. Laws 457 (water pollution)).
128. Phase II, 694 F.2d at 1385.
129. Id.
130. Id. ("The political clout of over 6,600 non-Indian commercial fishermen and 280,000 sport
fishermen,. . will require the State to manage the fish responsibly.").
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Existing statutes do not contradict the treaty right to habitat protection,
but neither do they acknowledge the special environmental right implied
from the Indians' treaty right to take fish. 131 The tribal right to take fish is
based on treaty promises. Those assurances are entitled to express consideration. Treaties remain the "supreme law of the land,"' 132 and by treaty,
Indians are afforded special protection beyond that extended to the citizenry in general. The federal courts have generally rejected equal protection
limitations on laws affecting Indians. 133, Indians have more than an equal
right to habitat protection; their fishing economy and culture is secured by
treaty. In managing the resource for the benefit of all fishermen the state
may-and indeed must-balance many conflicting considerations. Tradeoffs will occur. In honoring the treaty the state cannot make the same tradeoffs.
Although Indian and non-Indian fishermen share concerns about the.
diminishing resource generally, tribal rights are specific to particular
streams. 134 State statutes are deficient in protecting the treaty right because
they weigh the overall effect of development on the fisheries, rather than
specifically considering the effect of development on the individual fishing
locations of the various treaty tribes. For example, if the Nisqually River
were dammed, the right of the Nisqually Tribe to fish in its accustomed
place might well be extinguished. 135 The loss of a treaty stream's production affects the tribe using the stream more than it affects nontreaty users,
who can shift their fishing to other areas. Thus, the Indians' unique
geographic ties to their ancestral fishing grounds, treaty-protected by the
"usual and accustomed" language, require special consideration when
planning overall fisheries management.
The courts, then, must consider the two differing policies in implementing the reciprocal obligations of the state and the tribes toward the
shared fishery resource. Salmon conservation is one recognized goal;
honoring treaty rights is another. 136 In the present case, these policies are
131. The environmental protection statutes concerning anadromous fish are either silent as to
treaty rights or specifically protective. For example, the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h
(1982)) states: "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to affect or modify any treaty or other right of an
Indian tribe." 16 U.S.C. § 839g(e). The Salmon and Steelhead Conservation and Enhancement Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3345 (1982)), requires
tribal consent to implementation. 16 U.S.C §§ 3302(16), (18), 3321(b).
132. Johnson, The States versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing:A United States Supreme Court
Error,47 WASH. L. REv. 207, 208 (1972).
133. Johnson, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. L. Rav. 587, 588 (1979).
134. Phase 1, 384 F. Supp. at 332, 353.
135. Phase 1I, 694 F.2d at 1386.
136. "Great Nations, like great men, should keep their word." Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting).
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complementary, rather than competitive. In the past, the state has relied on
state regulation in the interest of conservation as an implicit limitation on
the treaty fishing right, essential to preserve the resource.137 The state
cannot now deny the same argument when conservation considerations
further the treaty fishing right.
The three-judge panel who first heard the Phase H appeal agreed that
"reckless or malicious" disregard for the effects of state projects on the
fishery, leading to a drastic decline in the available fish, would probably be
barred under the discriminatory regulation standard of Puyallup J.138
However, the principle of Puyallup I that prevents state regulations from
discriminating against the Indian fishery 139 is not broad enough to prevent
the nondiscriminatory granting of permits for projects with potentially
adverse environmental effects. Puyallup I would not prevent man-made
changes in the watersheds and estuaries that lead to nondiscriminatory
losses of salmon for both Indians and non-Indians. Salmon runs destroyed
through debasement of habitat are lost to all fishermen.
A shared resource gives rise to reciprocal obligations. A cooperative
stewardship of the anadromous fish runs between state and Indians requires
that the Indians' treaty right to habitat protection be formalized, as has the
state's right to regulate. The Supreme Court has upheld the state's regulatory jurisdiction in the interest of conservation;140 the tribes' interest in
habitat protection is equally entitled to affirmation.
A.

Scope: Defining Duty

Once a court determines that a right exists, it must also determine the
standard by which the right is to be measured: What is the precise scope of
the state's environmental duty? Three possible standards for measuring the
scope of the environmental right to habitat protection were considered by
the courts in Phase11: (1) no significant deterioration of the habitat should
be allowed;14 1 (2) the habitat must be protected to the extent necessary to
preserve sufficient fish to meet the tribes' moderate living needs; 142 or (3)
137. Phase11, 506 F. Supp. at 198. Pretrial preparation failed to uncover a single valid case of a
member of a treaty tribe exercising his fishing rights in a way that would endanger the anadromous fish
runs. Phase1, 384 F. Supp. at 338 n.26.
138. Phase 11, 694 F.2d at 1385.
139. PuyallupI, 391 U.S. at 398.
140. Puyallup 1, 391 U.S. 392; Puyallup 11, 433 U.S. 165; Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658.
Arguably, a basis for such power is lacking. According to the Constitution, treaties are the "supreme
law of the land." U.S. CoNsT. art VI, cl. 2. Treaties with Indians donotprovide for state regulation, and
Congress has never expressly authorized the states to regulate Indian fishing. Johnson, supra note 132,
at 208.
141. PhaseH, 506 F. Supp. at 207-08.
142. Id. at 208.
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the state and tribes must each take reasonable steps to preserve the fishery.143 A "no significant deterioration" standard could theoretically prohibit any developments that affect the fishery habitat. 144 The moderate
living standard is a quantitative measure of the treaty right, and the
reasonableness test is a qualitative measure of the state's duty to honor that
right. A modified reasonable efforts standard, with limits placed on the
state's discretion, would present a workable solution.
1.

No SignificantDeterioration

The Indians originally argued for the "no significant deterioration"
standard used by courts in other areas of environmental regulation, which
vmould preclude the state from appreciably reducing the environmental
quality of the fish habitat. 145 The "no significant deterioration" standard
was articulated by courts and expressly adopted by Congress in order to
carry out the goals of various environmental statutes. 146 The Phase I
district court found that the scope of the state's environmental duty must be
defined by the treaty-secured fishing right rather than by a desirable
standard imposed by Congress in a different context. 147 The court concluded that the scope of the right was measured by tribal needs. 148 The
United States did not cross-appeal the district court's ruling. The United
States acknowledged, on behalf of the tribes, the correctness of the moderate living standard. 149 In the context of modem development, to argue for
no significant deterioration of the salmon habitat is probably unrealistic.
2.

The ModerateLiving Standard

The moderate living standard was established as a minimal need in
Phase I of the present litigation. The Supreme Court in Fishing Vessel
divided the harvestable fish into approximately equal treaty and nontreaty
shares, with the stipulation that the treaty share could be reduced if tribal
143. Phase If, 694 F2d at 1381, 1389.
144. Note, supra note 8, at 480.
145. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 207.

146.

Id. at 208 (citing Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972)). See 42

U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1982) (Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401); United States Steel Corp. v. Train,
556 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1977); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) (1982) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f)
(1982) (Department of Transportation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1651); 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982) (Federal
Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1701).

147.
148.
149.
1982).

Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 208.
Id. at 205, 208.
Brief for Appellee, at 37 n.27, United States v. Washington (Phasell),694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.
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needs could be satisfied by a lesser amount. 150 The district court in PhaseII
adopted the limitation on the quantity of fish allocated to treaty tribes to
define the extent of the duty imposed upon the state to refrain from
degrading the fish habitat. 151
The district court's definition of the scope of the environmental right is
consistent with Supreme Court decisions concerning Indian treaty rights to
scarce natural resources. After determining that at the time of the treaties
the resource involved was necessary to the Indians' welfare, the Court made
apportionments that assured that the Indians' reasonable livelihood needs
would be met. 152 Using a similar analysis, the Ninth Circuit has also upheld
the moderate living standard in the context of reserved water rights. 153
The state argued that a tribal right of habitat protection based on
"moderate living" is unworkable because of the annual readjustments of
the fishing allocation based on varying individual incomes and market
fluctuations. 154 The state's fears are unfounded, however. The moderate
living standard is already in effect to measure the minimum quantity of fish
reserved to the Indians by treaty. 155 No such "annual readjustments" have
followed from that ruling. The moderate living standard is to be adjusted
150. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
685 (1979).
It bears repeating, however, that the 50% figure imposes a maximum but not a minimum
allocation. As in Arizona v. Californiaand its predecessor cases, the central principle here must be
that Indian treaty rights to a natural resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by
the Indians secures so much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a
livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living. Accordingly, while the maximum possible allocation
to the Indians is fixed at 50%, the minimum is not; the latter will, upon proper submissions to the
District Court, be modified in response to changing circumstances.
Id. at 686-87.
151. Phase H. 506 F. Supp. at 208.
152. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 600; Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564,576
(1908).
153.
In United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3536 (1984),
the court held that the Klamath Indians were entitled to the amount of water necessary to support their
hunting and fishing rights as currently exercised to maintain the livelihood of tribal members. Id. at
1415. The court determined that the scope of the implied reserved water right was circumscribed by the
necessity that called for its creation. Id. at 1409. The Winters doctrine itself reserves "only that amount
of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more." Cappaert v. United States, 426
U.S. 128, 141 (1976) (citing Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963)). At the time the
Klamath reservation was established, the government and the tribe intended to reserve a quantity of
water flowing through the reservation for the purpose of supporting agriculture for Indians and also for
maintaining the tribe's treaty right to hunt and fish on reservation lands. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1409. The
scope of the treaty right was measured by these purposes.
154. Brief for Appellant at 58-60, United States v. Washington (PhaseII), 694 F2d 1374 (9th Cir.
1982). The state argued that environmental protection statutes expressing congressional will on the
subject of habitat protection defined the limits of the treaty right. Id. at 49-51.
155. FishingVessel, 443 U.S. at 686-87. The treaties reserve to the tribes a sufficient quantity of
fish to satisfy their moderate living needs, subject to a ceiling of 50% of the harvestable fish. Id.
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downward only when the changed circumstances are substantial, 156 and the
state has the burden of proof in showing changed circumstances. 157 The
norhas any
state has not yet moved for a reduction of the tribes' allocation,
15 8
court.
district
the
by
such adjustment been declared
A more troubling aspect of the moderate living standard as a measure of
the state's environmental duty is its lack of precise interpretation of the
treaty right. The substantive right is affirmed; the duty imposed upon the
state is to refrain from degrading the fish habitat to an extent that would
deprive the tribes of their moderate living needs. 159 But what exactly must
the state do (or avoid doing) to implement that right? The district court
allocated burdens of proof in the event of future litigation. 160 It neglected to
define the respective responsibilities of the treaty parties in order to avoid
that litigation. The moderate living standard fails as a qualitative measure
of the state's duty to honor the treaty right.
3.

Reasonable Steps

Before the Ninth Circuit en banc decision not to review the merits of the
issue, the three-judge Ninth Circuit panel had proposed an alternative
standard: Both the state and the tribes must each take reasonable steps
proportional to the resources and abilities of each to preserve and enhance
the fishery.' 6 ' The panel rejected the district court's moderate living
standard, 162 based on an argument similar to the traditional equal protection doctrine, whereby persons similarly situated should be treated alike
under the law. 163 The panel reasoned that since Indians, as citizens, share in
the benefits of economic development in the state of Washington, fairness
requires that they "occasionally" bear a portion of the costs of such
nondiscriminatory development. 164
156. Id. at 687.
157. Id. at 686-87. Although the maximum possible allocation to the Indians is fixed at 50%, the
minimum is not; modification in response to changing circumstances can be made upon proper
submissions to the district-court.
158. Brief for Appellee at 38, United States v. Washington (Phase11), 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir.

1982).
159. Phase II, 506 F. Supp. at 208.
160. Id. The tribes bear the initial burden of proving that a challenged action will proximately
cause the fish habitat to be degraded; the state bears the burden of showing that any environmental
degradation of the fish habitat proximately caused by the state's activities (including authorizing third
parties' activities) will not impair the tribes' ability to satisfy their moderate living needs. Id.
161. Phase 11, 694 F.2d at 1389.
162. Id. at 1381, 1387.
163. Id. at 1387. See Johnson, supra note 133, at 590 n.25.
164. Phase II, 694 F.2d at 1387. "Occasionally" raises more questions than it answers: Exactly
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The Ninth Circuit panel's reliance on equal protection arguments was
inconsistent with prior decisions. The Supreme Court has approved special
treatment for Indians because of their unique status under the Constitution. 165 A treaty is a contract between sovereign nations. Contracts are
bargained exchanges; the Indians negotiated for special treatment in return
for valuable consideration, ownership rights to their land. They bargained
for the right to take fish; they did not bargain for the benefits and burdens of
economic development.
The "reasonable efforts" test alone, although plausible in theory, is
insufficient to give clear shape to the actual responsibilities of each party.
The ideal of a cooperative stewardship of the fishery resource is unlikely to
come to pass under such an ambiguous phrase. State/tribal cooperation has
become a reality in recent years, partly because of a recognition that joint
efforts are necessary to conserve an endangered resource, but more directly
because the tribes had the "legal clout" of the district court Phase H
decision, affirming their treaty right to habitat protection. 166
Although it cannot be suggested that the parties intended to demand
"unreasonable" efforts of the state, to frame the test solely in terms of
"reasonableness" suggests that the state's total interests might be introduced to show the reasonableness of its decisions regarding the treatyprotected fisheries habitat. Cooperation as suggested by the "reasonable
steps" test is a desired goal. But cooperation comes from mutual bargaining strength, rather than from a "reasonable steps" requirement without
definition of what those steps might be. The best standard for measuring the
extent of the state's duty might well encompass "reasonable steps," but
successful implementation requires that those obligations be specifically
outlined.
B.

Implementation: A ManageableApproach

The difficulty in implementing the environmental right to habitat protection lies in dealing with the realities of changed circumstances. Enforcing
century-old promises in today's world of dams and pollution presents a
perplexing problem. 167 The panel that originally reviewed the district court
decision feared that a right tied to moderate living needs would entitle the
when might the tribes be asked to bear the burden of economic development? Would it be only when the
costs of development get to a certain threshold? How might that threshold be determined? Would the
allocation of burden be entirely within the state's discretion? Or might the costs to the tribes be related to
when they benefit and when they do not? And who would make that determination?
165. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
166. Ervin, supra note 59, at 40, col. I.
167. This problem is not insoluble, however. See Phase I, 384 F. Supp. 312.
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tribes to compensation whenever fishing rights are extinguished by adverse
environmental impact such as dam building. 168 The court thought that a
right tied to moderate living needs would entitle the tribes to compensation
equivalent to their moderate living needs so long as their fishing rights
would have existed but for the building of the dam. 169 In this, the court was
in error. Compensation is not and should not be the solution.
The court wished to avoid turning the right to take fish into a guarantee of
the tribes' moderate living needs; 170 an income subsidy to the tribes as the
price of development did not seem beneficial to either Indians or nonIndians. 17 1The panel was concerned that under this approach the standard
would have a disproportionately disruptive effect on state agencies. The
agencies would have to place the highest priority on avoiding potential
impact upon fisheries that might reduce the income of tribal members. 172
Furthermore, the suggestion that a state could extinguish a treaty right and
pay compensation is without precedent; only the federal government has
such power. 173 Therefore, the solution to the habitat problem must not lie in
post-act compensation. The focus must be on prevention.
Similar state burden concerns were addressed in Sohappy v. Smith, 174
where state conservation regulations were at issue. There, the Oregon
district court held that the state was limited in its power to regulate the
Indians' federal treaty right to fish to regulations that (1) were necessary for
the conservation of fish; (2) did not discriminate against the Indians, and
(3) met appropriate standards. 175 In determining appropriate regulations,
the objective of conservation must not weigh more than the tribes' treaty
guaranteed rights. The two objectives must be seen as co-equal. 17 6 To
implement tribal rights, the Sohappy court required the state to provide the
tribes and their members with proper notice and an opportunity to partici77
pate meaningfully throughout the course of rulemaking procedures. 1
168. Phase II, 694 F.2d at 1386.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1387.
171. Id. at 1388.
172. Phasef!, 694F.2d at 1388. Thepanel of thec ircuit court instead proposed a "reasonableness"
limitation on the treaty right to environmental protection for the fisheries, as less intrusive on the state's
administrative process. Id. at 1389.
173. FAY CoHEN, supra note 1 at 148. The federal government exercised such power when it
destroyed the Indians' ancient fishing site on the Columbia River at Celilo Falls in 1957 by building the
Dalles Dam. Id.
174. 302 F. Supp. 899 (D. Or. 1969).

175. Id. at 900.
176. Id. at 911.
177. Id. at 912. Although the state's authority to prescribe restrictions within treaty-imposed
limitations is not dependent upon the assent of the tribes or of the Secretary of the Interior, the state may
adopt agreements with the tribes or defer to tribal preference in the exercise of its jurisdiction over
fishing rights. Both state and tribes are encouraged to pursue such a cooperative approach. Id.
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Sohappy concerned the extent to which the state could regulate Indian
fishing; 178 PhaseH concerned the extent to which the state must protect the
fish supply from environmental degradation. 179 Both situations involved
the state's obligation to honor treaty rights, but the Sohappy court specifically defined the nature of the state's duties, giving the interests of the
Indians appropriately serious consideration within the democratic process.1 80 As a practical matter, the treaty right cannot provide absolute
protection in the modern context of competing economic considerations.
The nation cannot return to the abundant fish and unpolluted streams of the
nineteenth century. Yet that does not mean that the rights of Indians can be
subrogated to other state goals. The Sohappy solution presents a pragmatic
approach to implementation, a way of asserting substantive rights through
participation in the state's regulatory processes.
Under the Sohappy approach, if the courts recognize habitat protection
as a treaty-guaranteed right, the state would have to take the right into
consideration when it makes its regulatory decisions. Currently the state
carries out its regulatory authority over public and private actions with
environmental impact by weighing competing economic and environmental objectives. Utilization of the Sohappy prescription would result in
adding to the balance consideration of the treaty right to conservation in the
form of salmon habitat protection, and in providing an opportunity for
meaningful participation in the regulatory hearings by treaty tribes. The
Sohappy court instructed the state to recognize that treaty tribes are
interested parties to any regulation affecting the treaty fishing right. 181 In
the same way, the treaty tribes should be equally interested parties to
regulations affecting the salmon habitat.
The substantive right of habitat protection, once judicially affirmed,
could be protected most effectively and economically through use of the
environmental procedures already in place. The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 182 and its state counterpart in Washington, the
State Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), 183 require that a detailed
environmental impact statement describing potential adverse effects 184 and
a discussion of alternatives1 85 accompany proposals for major action "significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 186 Major action
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. at 903-04.
Phase 11, 506 F. Supp. at 207.
Sohappy, 302 F. Supp. at 912.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 91-180, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982)).

183.

WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C (1985).

184.
185.
186.

42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i), (ii) (1982); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030(c) (1985).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (1982); Wash. Rev. Code § 43.21C.030(e) (1985).
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (1982); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030(c) (1985).
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is defined to include regulatory and licensing activites as well as proposals
87
for legislation. 1
Adding the special factor of the treaty-protected right to habitat protection as an additional consideration in environmental -impact statements
would implement the court's directive with minimal additional burden on
existing agencies. Sohappy suggests the method for implementation. It
proposed a standard of "equal consideration" in the context of regulating
Indian fishing. This standard should be replaced with one giving "special
weight" to Indian treaty rights in the context of habitat protection. i 88
Utilizing the Sohappy solution, the treaty-protected right could be given
special weight in the decision making process, without creating an absolute
bar to development. Judicial review of agency decision making with regard
to the fishery habitat right would rely on the same standards applicable to
other NEPA actions-procedural review of the adequacy of the impact
statement and a substantive review based on the good faith and balancing

tests. 189
The Phase I district court held that the state must demonstrate that its
activities or its authorization of third parties' activities will not impair the
tribes' ability to satisfy their moderate living needs. 190 The practical
application of this directive could be accomplished through procedures
similar to NEPA's section 101(b),191 in which agencies are obliged to use
all practicable means to improve their plans and actions to achieve environmental goals. What is required is a maximum effort to minimize detrimental effects. 192 A full discussion of alternatives and mitigation would be
required before agencies could authorize actions which might impinge
upon the treaty-protected right to habitat protection.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit, in its per curiam opinion, refused to allow declaratory
judgment on the environmental issue on procedural grounds. The court
erred. The Phase II district court's use of declaratory judgment regarding
187. WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21C.030 (1985). NEPA has been accorded a similar interpretation
judicially. W. RoDGERs, ENviRolmaTrAL LAw 813 (1977). For a complete discussion of NEPA, see W.
RoDmEs, supra, at 697-834.
188. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (nondiscriminatory equal treatment not sufficient to

meet treaty obligations).
189.
decision
Defense
190.
191.
192.

"Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first determine if the agency reached its
after a full, good faith consideration and balancing of environmental factors." Environmental
Fund v. Corps of Engineers (Gillham Dam), 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972).
506 F. Supp at 208.
42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982).
W. RoDGERs, supra note 187, at 748.
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both the environmental issue and the hatchery fish issue should have been
affirmed. Declaratory judgment on the implied environmental right to
fisheries habitat protection would have clarified the legal relations in issue
and provided relief from the uncertainty giving rise to the proceeding. It
would have been consistent with the procedure followed during the fourteen-year history of this involved and complex litigation.
The merits of the district court's declaration on the environmental issue
also should have been affirmed. The Ninth Circuit should recognize the
Indians' treaty right. The duty of the state to refrain from degrading the fish
habitat to the extent that would deprive treaty tribes of their moderate living
needs is the quantitative measure of that treaty right. This conclusion is
supported by the canons of construction applicable to Indian treaties, the
precedent of other fishing rights cases, analogies to water law cases, and
the practical necessity for judicial affirmation of the right. A modified
reasonable efforts test, with limits placed on the state's discretion, would
define the state's duty to honor that right. Implementation could be effectively accomplished through existing environmental protection procedures.
Affirmation of the treaty tribes' right to have the fishery habitat protected
from man-made despoliation would benefit all fishermen-non-Indian
commercial and sports fishermen, as well as tribal fishermen-and reconcile their competing interests into a common goal: preservation and
enhancement of an endangered resource. Judicial acknowledgment of the
Indians' treaty right to habitat protection would promote the ideal of a
cooperative stewardship of the anadromous fish runs.
Judith W. Constans

